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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the philosophy of
John Dewey as a philosophical basis and apologetic for political democracy, according to the traditional understanding of
democracy in the United States.

Since Mr. Dewey has evolved

his own theory of democracy, it has been necessary to establish, first of all, the traditional concept before treating

ot Mr. Dewey's social theory and its relations with that concept.
In the historical treatment of the notion of constitutional democracy, I avoided the more controversial issues regarding the contract theory of government and the origin of authority, and restricted the description to those notions most
commonly accepted.
With regard to the basic political philosophy of Instrumentalism, I have followed the theory which Mr. Dewey outlined
in

~

Public

~

!!!

Problems.

I endeavored to fill in, where

necessary, with fuller explanations or intelligence, experience,
human nature, and values from Mr. Dewey's other works.
Both in the

ex~lanation

of the basic political philosophy
1

2

and in its application to democracy, it was necessary to distinguish between Mr. Dewey the social philosopher and Mr.
Dewey the astute commentator on world history and current affairs, for in the latter role much that he writes is merely a
forceful expression otr common experience and common sense.
But there are certain guiding principles, key ideas, and methods of approach that distinguish his treatment of social philosophy.

Consequently by singling out these characteristic

ideas and methods, I have not followed in exact detail the
argument of any one book.

Another reason for this selection is.

that Mr. Dewey devises his own terminology and sometimes refers to the same problem or line of thought under a different
heading, so for the sake of consistency I have chosen to use
the same

t~r.ms

throughout. For the most part, I have endeavored

to use Mr. Dewey's terminology throughout this thesis.
Finally there is no effort here to make a moral eva:luation
of Instrumentalism as a political philosophy, but merely to
analyze it in ita relation to .American constitutional democracy.

CHAPTER II

THE NAME AND CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY
Democracy is a much abused term.

For generations it has

been a shibboleth of political campaigns and has become so hackneyed and vague in popular usage thLt it no longer suffices to
distinguish Gileadite from Ephramite.

It has been the rallying

cry of two world wars and through the peculiar exigencies of
the second has become acceptable even to the •uthoritarians
of the Stalinist school of practical politics.
In America three divergent trends have recently been united under the common name of democracy: the systems of
thought that have their root in some kind of progressive evolution, post•Kantian philosophical scepticism, and the cult
of modern science.

The new democracy that incorporates these

three streams of thought has been briefly spnthesiz.ed by Professor Boyd Bode:
The newer developments in both the natural
sciences and the social order point to the
conclusion that standards of value and conduct are flexible and changing products of
everyday experience and are to be judged by
no other test than the enrichment of human
life here and now. This is the wider meaning of the term democracy, a meaning which
transforms it from a political concept i~to
a whole way of life. This conception of
values and conduct has never prevailed in
the past. It cannot prevail now except at
3

the price of extensive reconstruction in
our beliefs and attitudes and inatitutions.l

4

It would seem that the wider view of democracy which Professor Bode proposes was contained radically in the principles
of the particular philosophy of political democracy from which
it was transformed.

And though it is not the purpose of this

work to analyze this new cultural-social concept, however, by
an analysis of the political philosophy which underlies it as
tested by its effect when applied to the traditional institutions of American representative democracy, at least the basis
of the liberty and freedom promised by this new order may be
sounded.
But before passing on to a study of the fact of political
democracy as it has existed and been understood in the past,
the place of the political philosophy of Instrumentalism in
relation to the broader cultural concept may be made clear
from Professor Eduard Lindeman's description of the background and aims of the men promoting the new democracy, for
he wrote thus of the contributors to the first publication of
The Conference On The Scientific Spirit And The Democratic
Faith:
They were, borrowing Emerson's famous phrase,
•radical democrats" who believed in freedom.

1 B.D. Bode,

~

!! Learn, Heath, Boston, 1940, 296.

They believed that all genuine authority
comes from within and is not external.
Most of them, but by no means all, belonged
to the American philosophic tradition of
which William James and John Dewey may be
said to have been the chief architects.
With respect to science they could not be
called positivists, certainly not in the
Comtean sense, but they were persons believing in the dynamic power of science
and truth. The majority of those who
represented religious interests were of
the humanist persuasion. The synthesis
which they sought was one which combines
science as a search for truth, democracy
as the guarantee of liberty, humanism as
the source of faith, and education as the
instrument of progress. The truth they
a·eek is neither apologetic nor externally
authoritarian; the freedom which they affirm includes freedom to collaborate; and
the education which they recommend consid•
ers learning to be an everlasting adjustment to changing circumstances.2

5

From an analysis of the philosophical basis of the political
democracy the radical democrat professes and the type of liberty this democracy guarantees, it is to be hoped one may
gain a more penetrating insight into the whole of the creed.
To try, then, to get at the meaning of the more limited
topic of political democracy, at least as it is understood
in America, John Dewey's procedure is a wise one,
T·o discuss democratic government at large
apart from its historical background is

2 The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, King's Crown
Press, New York, 1944,-xi.

6

to mise its point and to throw away all
means for an intelligent criticism of it •••
We limit the topic for discussion in such
a w~y as to avoid the great bad, the mixing of things which need to be kept distinct.3
One of the earliest and most important treatises in the
genesis of the modern democracy was Aristotle's Politics.

In

it he divided the constitutions or types of government that
were known at that time into three divisions, all of them
according to the number of those in control, whether one, a
few, or the many.

If the rule was for the common good, the

government was good.

The good governments were (again ac-

cording to the number ruling) kingdom, ari. stocracy, and constitution; the bad governments, where an interest other than the
common good prevailed, were tyranny, aristocracy, and democracy.4

Hence according to this division, democracy was of

its nature bad--democracy was distinguished from the constitutional government by reason of the fact that in the former the poor ruled, in the latter a large military class.
Aristotle's argument was that the majority would always be
poor and the poor would always rule in their own interest as
opposed to the interest of the oommunity. 5

3

J. Dewey,
1927, 83.

!£! Public and !!! Problems, Holt, New York,

4 Aristotle, ~Treatise On Government, trans. by W. Ellis,
Dent, London
5.For opposite view of. J. Ryan, The Commonweal, XL, 608.

7

The discussion as to the best kind of government, as
treated by Aristotle and the Scholastics was chiefly a question of operational efficiency.

The mixed regime, including

monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements, advocated
by st. Thomas Aquinas and St. Robert Bellarmine, were the
conclusion not so much of philosophical principles as of the
political experience of their day.6

But the political think-

ers of the Middle Ages made a very definite and important contribution to a philosophy of democracy in their explanation of
the juridical genesis of civil society and government, for
the doctrine which placed the origin of government in the free
consent of the governed, so fully developed and defended by
Suarez:. and Bellarmine, was the common teaching of the late
Middle Ages.7
However, the greatest contribution of Christianity to the
development of democracy was the new concept of the value and
dignity of the human person.

It w as this doctrine of human

dignity and natural rights that accounted for the steady

pro~

gress toward a constitutional democracy through safeguards

6 P.V.Kennedy, •The Principles of Democracy8 , Proceedi~s
American Catholic Philosophical ~sooiation, Wasfiing~n

D.c.,

!9~9,

7 A. Rahilly,

17o.

111

.

Suarez. and Democracy", Studies, VII 1 13, 14.

8

established for the prerogatives of the individual and special
groups.

st. Thomas had observed that custom has greater au-

thority than the ruler since it represents the will of the
whole people.8

W,ith an increasing number of charters .. -freely

granted or extorted from monarchs by force--securing the rights
and privileges of lords 1 barons, religious communities and
cities 1 custom asgwmed the force of law and an opening wedge
was entered for the growth of the constitutional democracy;
for gradually the bourgeoise and the common man were able to
claim as

rightly theirs, what at

~irst

had been secured only

to a few.
But there is an entirely new body of political theory
that has had an important influence in the forming of contemporary notions of democracy and in many points it is at
odds with the constitutional tradition of Western Europe.
For Jean Jacques Rousseau proposed a philosophy of government
which at once asserted freedom and was directly responsible
for the growth of a revolutionary spirit and on the other hand
provided theoretical basis for the complete disregard of the
rights of minorities and individuals.
According to the Rousseauvlan theory, the majority bas
&bsolute and complete power over the whole of the body politic:

8 T. A\qu.inas, Summa Theologioa,Marietti, Taurini, 1937, Tom.II,
I·II, q.97, a.3, ad 2.

9

nature gives each man absolute power
over all his members, the social compact g1 vas the body poll tic absQ.lute power over all its members also; and it .is
this power which, under the direction of
the general will, bears, aa I have said,
the name of sovere1gnty.9

As·

Each man alienates, I admit, by the social compact, only such part of his powers, goods and liberty as it is impor•
tant for the community to control; but
it must also be granted that the sover- ·
eign is sole judge of what is important.lO
The effects of this doctrine in practice were manifested in
Paris during the dictatorship of the Directoire.

The tradi-

tion has been maintained in democratic France in anti-clerical legislation and a state monopoly of schools.
But in America, the constitutional tradition, with roots
in Scholastic philosophy, was a more important factor in the
drafting of the Constitution of the United States and in the
campaign which eventually sold it to the colonists than was
Jacob1n spirit and theory.

For the jealous defense of lo-

cal autonomy and the demand for a Bill of Rights was based
on something more than narrow provincial suspicions.

After

all, the basic grievances set forth in the polemics of the
Revolution--however accurate their application to the specific1nc1dents of the time--were that charter-rights or the

9 J. J. Rousseau, The S!}c-ial Contract And Discourses, trans. by

G.D.H. Cole, Ever-yman's Library, Den£; London, 1930, II,4, 27.

10 Ibid., II, 4, 27.

unwritten natural rights of man had been violated.

In spite

10

of the religious intolerance of the times, there was an universal theoretical recognition of the rights of the indi•
vidual and the struggles of the dissident non-established
sects tended to strengthen the legal position of the minority group.
In fact the emphasis of the Founding Fathers on a government of laws rather than of men was so pronounced that
certain critics of democracy writing from entirely divergent viewpoints concur in declaring that democracy as a name
was odious and as a system of government was feared throughout the first half century of American history.

The avowed

liberals, Charles and Mary Beard, describe the situation
thus:
For at no time, at no place, in solemn
convention assembled, through no chosen
agents, had the ~erican people officially proclaimed the United States to
be a democracy. The Constitution did
not contain the word or any word lending
countenance to it, except possibly the
mention of •we, the pJiople, • in the preamble. Nor, indeed, did the Constitution even proclaim a republic. It did
guarsn tee a republican form of government in the states, but as John Adams
wrote to Mercy Warren, during their
heated controversy over political aims,
nobody knew just what that meant. As •
matter of fact, when the Constitution
was framed no respectable person called
himself or herself a democrat. The
very word then had low connotations,
though it was s:> me times mentioned with

11

detachment; and the connotations became distinctly horrible to Respectabil-·
i ty a:f'ter the out· break of the reign of
terror ln France.ll
This suspicion of the name, democracy, continued, for
as the historians Beard go on to relate, not until Jackson
ran against John Quincy Adams was the term "Democrat" used
to denominate a candidate for President or a political party

and at that Jackson was known as a •Democratic-Republican• to
distinguish him from the other Republican, Adams.

It was not

until 1852 with Pierce that the Party of Jefferson and Jacks:on becAme known as Democrats.
And the authoritarian, Francis Stuart Campbell, after
quoting voluminously from prominent early Americans con•
cludes:
There is something pathetic in seeing
Americans almost daily besmirching unconsa:iously their ideals and their
traditions--all thanks to a faulty education. The Founding Fathers would
turn in their graves if they could hear
themselves called "'Democrats"; America.
indeed was never a democracy, and never
will be ••• unles.S. we make "democracy work"
and rep~ce within the framework of
a ~pure democracy", our legislation by
the Gallup Poll. Those who have been
taught the wrong interpretation may
ask their money back from the schools
where they have wasted their adolescence.

11 C.A. and M.R. Beard,
New York, 1939, 922.

~erica ~

Midpassage, Macmillan,

12.
And the textbooks which preach a spu~ious democracy may still provide us
with fuel in cold days to come.l2
Perhaps the main reason for the avoidance of the w·ord,
democracy, in colonial literature was a more technical interpretation of its meaning.
by Madison in

The distinction is carefully drawn

~Federalist:

Under the confusion of names , it has
been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a
democracy only; and among others, the
observation that it can never be established but among a small number of
people, living within a small compass
of territory. Such a fallacy may have
been the less perceived, as most of the
popular governments of antiquity were
of the democratic species;- and even in
modern Europe, to which we owe the great
principle of representation, no example
is seen of a government wholly popular,
and founded at the same time wholly
on that principle. If Europe has the
merit of discovePing this great mechah•
ical power in government, by the simple
agency of shich the will of the largest
political body may be concentred, and
ita force directed to any object which
the: public good requires, America can
claim the merit of making the discovery
the basis of unlimited and extensive
republics. It is only to be lamented
that any of her citizens should wish to
deprive her of the additional merit of
displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprfhensive system
no• under consideration. 3

12

F.s.

Campbell, The Menace of the Herd, Bruce, Milwaukee,
1943, 8.
- ~

13 J. Madison, The Federalist, Modern Library Edition, Random House, New York, 80.

Since the question debated by the colonists was the erection

13

of a representative government, the use of the word democratic,
would only have confused the issue aa it was understood to
mean government exercised directly by the citizens.

When

Madison uses. the word, popular, he includes that basic concept of

d~ooracy

today, the idea of control and direction

by the bulk of the people.

It would also be a mistake to

think that the importance and the place of the people in the
immediate decision of policy and direction of government was
not carefully considered, even theugh the term, degree of
democracy, was not used to describe the object of the deliberations.l4
The use of the term, democracy, however, to signify
merely control and general direction by the people was not
entirely unheard of in colonial times; for Alexander Hamilton, the man generally considered to head the opposition to
popular government and the Jacobin spirit, spoke of democracy in laudatory terms and clearly defined what he meant
by the terms he used:
That instability is inherent in the nature of popular governments I think very
disputable; unstable democracy is an epi-

14 For the important discussion on the role of a Representative and the discussion concerning instructed vs. uninstructed delegates, of. Annals of Con~ress, First Congress, Gales and Seaton, Washington, .c., 1834, 796.

14
thet frequently in the mouths of politicians; but I believe that from a strict
wxamination of the matter--from the records of history, it will be found that
the fluctuations of governments in which
the popular principle has borne a consi•
derable sway, have proceeded from its being compounded with other principles;-and from its being made to operate in an
improper channel. Compound governments
though they may be harmonious in the beginning will introduce distinct interests,
and these interests will clash, throw the
State into convulsions, and produce a
change or dissolution. When the deliberative or judicial powers are vested wholly or partly in the collective body of the
people, you must expect error, confusion,
and instability. But a representative
democra~,(Italics not in originai.)where
the righ of election is well secured and
regulated, and the exercise of the legislative, exeeutive, and judiciary authorities is vested ins elect persons, chosen
really and not nominally by the people,
will, in my opinion, be most likely to be
happy, regular, and durable.l5
This channeling of the democratic principle which Hamilton describes through the separation of legislative, judicial and executive functions has, according to Fr. Wilfred Parsons, come
t,o signify democracy for the contemporary American.l6

15 A. Hamilton, Letter to Governor Morris, May 19, 1777, The
Works of .&lexander Hamilton, ed. by H.C. Lodge, PutnamTS;

New Yori, 1963, IX, 72.

.

16 •The fact of the matter is that there is not a single government in Europe today that is democratic in the sense
that we Americans use the word. Probably the single characteristic which to Americans, rightly or wrongly, specifies our concept of democracy is the separation of the
executive, legislative and judicial functions." W. Parsons, Vlh.ich Way Democracy, Macmillan, New York, 1939, 59.

15

F;rom the tradition of Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln,
government of the people, the common man, the man in the
street, John

~~

Public, and G.I. Joe have become part of the

overtone of American democracy.

Just as, for instance, stat&

robes 1 complicated ceremonials and temporary titles are a
part of the very real though diminutive democracy of San
'

Marino, so a careful avoidance of titles and a tendency to
limit ceremony to simple, bare essentials has been part of the
~erican

tradition.

It is this glorification of the common

man and political non-recognition of social classes that is
emphasized in recent comparie:tf)n of the Soviet and the Amer•
ican •democracies."
Before proceeding to devise a formula for the chief
notes of American constitutional democracy, it might be well
to recall by way of contrast certain other approaches and
methods used in explaining democracy.

There is, for instance,

the point of view of Professor Bode and the members of the
Conference on the Scientific Spirit and the Democratic Faith,
an opinion previously cited 1 which holds that democracy is
something new on the face of the earth, that it is a way of
life wherein standards of value and conduct are considered
as flexible changing products of everyday life to be judged
by no other standard than the enrichment of human life here
and now.

But even the proponents of the new democracy admit

it is new and concede that the moral concept of the natural

law was the historical basis o£ democracy.!~ Whether or not

16

the adherents of this new viewpoint have become numerous enough to challenge seriously the statement that American democracy

is still popularly considered to be based on the natural

law, is irrelevant to the present discussion.

It is enough

to note that the constitutional tradition has been the basis
of the system of

gover~ent

which exists today in the United

States of America.
By following an historical treatment, no mention ha8 been
made of various theories that emphasize some one particular element as chiefly responsible for the development of
political democracy.

It is, for instance, the custom of

those who £ollow the Rousseauvian tradition as the cldef
contributing factor to democracy to analyze the threefold
slogan: liberty, fraternity, equality. ra This approach usually leads to a cultural rather than a political discussion.
Then there is the revival of the Augustinian concept of love
~s

the motive £orce of all human as sociation.

M. Bergson

made some rather startling assertions in this regard, which
Jacques Maritain modifies and incorporates in his doctrine
of the philosophy of person as the one true basis of demo•

17 J. Dewey, Freedom and Culture, Putnam's, New York, 1939, 163.
18 T.V. Smith, The Democratic Way of Life, Chicago Univ. Press,
Chicago, 1926; Dewey, Character an~ents, II, 580.

cracy. 19

Recently, too, Professor Perry has emphasiz.ed the

17

role of Puritanism as an ideological root of American democracy.20
As a conclusion to this treatment of the historical gene•

sis of the name and concept of democracy in America, the following three notes may be said to be characteristic of that
democracy today.

First, there is that basic element of demo-

cracy referred to by Madison and Hamilton as the popular element.

This chief note has been well summarized by Charles

Merriam:
Democracy is a form of political association in which the general control
and direction of the political policy
of the commonwealth is habitually de•
termined by the bulk of the community
in accordance with appropriate understandings and procedures providing for
popular participation and consent.21
The second note has to do with what has been referred to
as the Bill-of-Rights aspect of democracy.

It concerns the

recognition of the sanctity of the human person, the rights
of the minority and the necessary dependence and harmony of

19 J. Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, Macmillan, New
York, 1940, 85.
·
20 R.B. Perry, Puritanism!.!!!! Democracy, New York, 1944
21 C.E. Merriam, The New Democracy and the New Despotism, McGrawHill, New York:-I9~ 11.
--- ---

the contract of government with the natural law.

18

The third note, while not fundamental, is the idea usually
contained in the adjective, democratic, that is a certain em•
phasis on the political and social equality of all citizens
whether or not they happen to be holding public office.

CHAPTER III
THE BASIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF INSTRUMENTALISM
In studying any aspect of John Dewey's philosophy, it
is well to bear in mind Dewey's own approach.

His is not

a philosophy of positive propositions, it is more a method of
study and analysis of concrete situations and interactions.
Hence one would not be justified in singling out a central
thesis as the heart of Mr. Dewey's philosophy without having
first proved that such is the case.

It is Professor Dewey's

continual theme that we cannot predict with certainty and
it may be that experience will even dictate a change in the
very method of study.
It is true, however, that there is an implicit metaphysics in Instrumentaliam, wherein •experience" takes the place
of being.

This experience, as it is interpreted by

~ohn

Dew-

ey, is broader and.more comprehensive than the ordinary definition attributed to the term by common usage.

By exper-

ience, Dewey understands: nrcertain modes of interaction,
of correlation, of natural objects among which the organism
happens, so to say, to be one. tt,l

But this over-all concept

1 J. Dewey, •The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy", Creative
Intelligence, Holt, New York, 1917, 37.
ltJ

of experience does not necessarily make Instrumentalism a
monistic or holistic philosophy, for as

20

William O'Meara

points out:
Thus considered, Instrumentalism is a
variety of pluralism ••• as such it has
been called tt.concatenism" which term
is intended to mean a pluralism of entities which do not exclude one another
but are said to uoverlap! Dewey approves the word "overlap• when taken
to refer to the fact that for genuine
continuity of experience, an experience
however unique in its own quality must
be seen as containing~somethi~g that
points to other experiences.•
Such a basic concept necessarily implies a non-essentialist approach to

~ocial

or political problems;

cessarily rejects traditional concepts and

de~ds

it nea purely

empirical analysis of individual concrete happenings as the
basis of its tentative predictions.

Thus to analyze a so-

cial concept or institution, Professor Dewey has recourse
to an historical interpretation of the concrete instances
which gave rise to the growth of that institution or idea.
In a:n effort to analyze the traditional concept of
human nature, he has recourse to the method of Plato's

" W. O'Meara, nJohn Dewey and Modern Thomism•, The Thomist, V,
315. Confer also W. Savery, "The Significance-or Dewey*s
Philosophy", ~ Philosophl of John ~ewe~, ed. by P.A.
Schilpp, N.U.Press, Evanston, 1~ 88- , a:lso Ibid., 545.

21

Republic
I may seem to be going far a£ield if I
refer to Plato's statement of the way
by which to determine the constituents
of human nature. The proper method he
said was to look at the version of human nature written in large and legible
letters in the organization of classes
in society, before trying to make it
out in the dim ·petty version found in
individuals.3
•
But he does not use the method as Plato did, that is as a
~

purely analogical approach.

For at best Plato hoped merely

to find some similarity between the justice he found on a
large scale in the state and the justice he found in a
smaller version in the'individual.4

Dewey, however, often

bases his analysis of human beings and human nature directly
on the study of society in the large, since there is only a
gradual distinction between the components of experience
of which the human organism is but one.
Before proceeding to the direct analysis of political
society, for a better understanding of the notion of human
nature, Dewey begins by prescinding from given sources of what
is;

there is to be no discussion of causes, merely of acts

and consequenCE:?& and he introduces the one positive and

:3 J. Dewey,

Freedom~

Culture, Putnam's, New York, 1939, 107.

4 Plato, The Republic, ed. by B. Jowett and L. Campbell, Oxford,
1894, 3W""a.

22
determining factor in all of his social theories, intelligence.

We must in any case start from acts which
are performed, not from hypothetical
causes for those acts, and consider their
consequences. We must also introduce intelligence, or the observation of consequences as consequences, that is in connection with the acts from which they proceed.5
In other words, the purpose of this

prelL~inary

caution is to

warn the reader against the tendency to attribute any consistent pattern of acts which may be. observed in the individual
or the group to some component of all human beings as a source
of these acts.

The notion of intelligence is introduced to

preclude any dialectic necessitarianism.
Professor Dewey points out that an awareness of human
nature arose with efforts to control it, for

~en

we are

attempting to control anything we are acutely aware of what
resists us.•6

He reasons that man became aware of some kind

of force in human beings from the fact that they react dif•
ferently from inanimate objects when an effort is made to
control them and direct their actions.

The argument continues

that the distinction between good and bad in human nature corresponded to the pliability

of that force. Insofar as the

5 The Public and Its Problems, 13.
6 J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Holt, New York, 1922, 1.
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child or the s:erf yielded to the direction of parent or master,

society called the native force or nature of the one yielding
good.

This pseudo-historical analysis of the origin of the

concept of human nature, while
~Republic,

a~hn

following the method of

has definite Rousseauvian implications.

The

concoction of this theory was, of course, necessitated by
Professor Dewey's denial of any definite end for man against
which his nature and actions could be judged as means
We are forced therefore to consider the
nature and origin of that control of human nature with which morals has been
occupied. And the fact which is forced
upon us when we raise this ~uestion is
the existence of classes. Control has
been vested in an oligarchy. Indifference to regulation has grown in the gap
which separates the ruled from the rulers. Parents, priests, chiefs, social
censors have supplied aims, aims which
w.ere foreign to those upon whom they
were imposed, to the young, laymen, ordinary fold; a few have given and administered rule, and the mass have in a passable fashion and with reluctance obeyed.
Everybody knows that good children are
those who make as little trouble ~s possible for their elders, and since most
of them cause a_good deal of annoyance
they must be naughty by nature. Generally speaking, good people have been
those who did what they were told to
do, and lack of eager compliance is a
sign of something wrong in their nature.7
But as to the nature of that force which men first dis-

7 Ibid., 2.
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covered in their efforts to control it, Professor Dewey must
again take an unusual stand by reason of his theory of experience.

He denies that impulse and instinct are innate and

primary and his explanation follows from the overlapping of
the components of experience.

You cannot speak of the pri-

mary and innate urges of a person, since the person and his
environment overlap in the chain of experience and it is difficula as yet to determine whether this force we call in·
atinct belongs to both the person and the environment or to
either the person or environment alone.

For instance, apeak-

ing of the dries of a new-born infant:
It is an meaningless as a gust of wind
on a mud puddle apart from a direction
given it by the presence of other persons, apart from the responses they make
to it. It is a physical spasm, a blind
dispersive burst of wasteful energy.8
In answering the assertion that there are bas:tc instincts
common to all men, that are evident realities and the components of human nature, the Professor admits that sexual desire and hunger are realities, but he

co~pares

them to the

realities of suction, rusting of metals, thunder and lightning and remarks that:
science and invention did not get on
&s long as men indulged in the notion of special forces to account

8 Ibid., 90.

for such phenomena ••• Advance in insight
and control came only when the mind
turned squarely around. After it had
dawned upon inquirers that their alleged
causal forces were only names which condensed into a duplicate form a variety
of complex occurrences, they set about
breaking up phenomena into minute detail and searching for correlations •••
The psychology of behavior is only beginning to undergo similar treatment.9
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In general, from arguments like these, Dewey denies any
of the distinctive notes that have been said to be proper to
human nature.

He further refuses to consider any initial prop-

erty of an object either as the cause of it's actions or of
its effect on others and in this regard seems to deny the
possibility of essential knowledge from induction.

But it

would be inaccurate to say that Professor Dewey denies the
possibility of human nature, however limited that concept may
in reality be.

Rather it would seem his attitude is to dis-

credit what has been

advan~ed

as proper to human nature and to

point to the social danger and intellectual inaccuracy in the
traditional use of the term.
It may be asked, since optimistic or pessimistic notions of human nature are fundamental to any political philosophy, whether Instrumentalism is in the tradition of Rousseauvian optimism.

9 Ibid., 149

It would not be correct to reply with an

unqualifi~d

affirmative.
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It is true that in his interpreta-

tion of history Dewey tends to lay much of the blame for the
evils of the world to outmoded institutions and conventions of
civilization, but only as unfavorable partial conditions.

He

would not condemn civilization or any single institution of
civilization as being in itself at all times a corrupting influence, for what might be an advantageous condition in one
set of circumstances becomes detrimental with a change in
those circumatances.lO
Nor does Professor Dewey subscribe entirely to the opt~mistic

point of view that human nature if released from

hampering bonds will of itself, by an automatic self Esssrtion realize its own beat interests.
Political and legal institutions may
be altered even abolished; but the
bulk of popular thought which has been
shaped to their pattern persists. This
is why glowing predictions of the immediate coming of a, social millenium
terminate so uniformly in disappointment, which gives point to the standing suspicion of the cynical conservative about radical changes ••• Where general and enduring moral chamgea do accompany an external revolution it is
because appropriate habits of thought
have previously been insensibly matured.ll

10 Cf. Dewey's analysis of the varying role of natural law
concept in "Nature and Reason in Law", Character and Events,
II, 790.
--11 Human Nature and Conduct, 108.

2.7

Not only the Marxian concept of a single revolution that will
.

.

bring about the milenniUJp, but even the Nineteenth Century
concept of the continual march of evolution is repugnant to
Instrumentalism:
There is somethin§ pitifull~ juvenile
in the idea that evolution , progress,
means a definite sum of accomplishment which will forever stay done and
which by an exact wmount lessens the
amount still to be done, disposing once
and for all of just so many perplexities
and advancing us just so far on our
road to • final stable and unperplexed
goal. Yet the typical nineteenth centurY,
mid-Victorian conception of evolution
was precisely a formulation of such consummate juveni11sm.l2
·
The optimism of John Dewey rather approaches Kant's notion of the struggle for holiness, a contest that goes on ad
infinitum with new problema and obstacles continually

pre~

aenting themselves, but the emphasis is on the present partial
a.chievement that lends incentive and direction to future
efforts.
Positive attainment, actual enrichment
of meaning and powers opens new vistas
and sets new tasks, creates new.aims and
stimulates new efforts. The facts are
not such as to yield unthinking optimism
and consolation, for they render it 1m..
possible to rest upon attained goods. 13

12.

~.,

285.

13

ill!!•

288
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The question of faith in the people as a political group will
be treated at greater length further on.
Before passing to Dewey's analysis,of society and the
state, there is. one further element in his positive doctrine
on human nature that needs elucidation.

That element is the

place of ~intelligence~ in human nature.

It seems that the

primary function of intelligence is to

fore~•st

what will be,

if certain steps are taken; and in what is, to discriminate
between good and bad, that is between what will be advantageous in future actidms and what will not. •And I repeat while
we hear much about intelligence, the effect of any theory that
identifies intelligence with the given, instead of with foreM
sight of bett·eir' and worse is a denial of the function of in ...
4
telligence."JBy a denial of a. connection between intelligence and the given, Dewey means that thoughts and perceptions are not accidents of the knower:
Now dreams and hallucinations, errors
pleasures, and pains, possible •secondary"
qualities, do not occur save where
there are organic centers of experience.
They cluster about a subject. But to
treat them a.s things which inhere exclusi veJy in the subject; or as posing
the problem of a distortion of the real
object by a knower set over against the
world, or as presenting facts to be explained primarily as cases of contemplative knowledge, is to testify that

14 Character and Events, II, 797.

one has still to learn the lesson of
evolution in its application to the affaire in hand.l5
Perhaps the Instrumentalist notion of intelligence might
be conceived as & power of certain •organic centers of experience"'--up to the present it has been found only in human beings--to make use of the present reaction so to affect the euvironment as to direct its future effects and thus to a certain extent control future reactions.

It is a kind of liv-

ing transformer with the faculty of seeing what is good for
itself and operating accordingly.

The notion is exteemely

important in political theory, since it is the one factor
that can change the course of events and upon which any convept of progress and retrogression must depend.
In • brief summary, Dewey's doctrine on human nature relies on a method which rejects all argument from a common effect to a common cause.

In an historical analysis of the con-

cept of human nature, he sees it as a vague unknown force
which cannot be isolated in individual human beings or even
in society as a whole, a force which man has become aware of
through his efforts to control it.

One sociological impli-

cation of his reasoning is that an oligarchy which sets the
social aims and taboos has arisen through a concerted effort

15 Creative Intelligence, 36.
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to control that force.

The~

only positive element of that force,

thus far partially isolated and analyzed is intelligence and
intelligence merely directs reactions to

singula~

concrete sit-

uations.
To proceed, then, to the study of political society as
such, Dewey arrives at his conclusions from

~

study of acts

and consequences:
consequences are of two kinds, those
which Affect the persons directly engaged in the transaction, and those which
affect others beyond those immediately
concerned. In this distinction, we find
the germ of the distinction between public and private.l6
It is from this distinction of private and public, that Dewey
prefers to derive the notion of the state, rather than from
the notion of society, ·for, as he points out, any act jointly
performed by several may be termed social even though the direct consequences are limited to those participating in the
act.

And a private act may be socially valuable by indirect

consequences.

In carrying out this distinction, Dewey de-

clares that the public is not to be identified with the socially useful, and he mentions as examples of public activities which were not socially useful, unnecessary wars and
unfair tariffs.

16 The Public

~

!!! Problems, 12.
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As a result of these distinctions, certain definitions

are arrived at:
"'Pri ve. tettr is defined in opposition to
"'official", a private person being one
deprived of public position. The public
consists of all those who are affected
by the indirect consequences of trans&ctions to s~ch an extent that it is
deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for. Officials are those who look out for and
take care of the interests thus affected.l7
(Italics are not in original.)
From these definitions Dewey erects his notion of a state, illustrating its historical genesis with explanations of how
a connnon interest bound all those who were adversely affected
by the transactions of others, by feuds, robber bands, etc.
The state proper consists of the measures and rules
thought to be required by the common interest. for the sup...
pression of evil consequences which extend beyond the original
participants of the act and of certain persons appointed to
be guardians, executors and interpreters of these rules and
me&sures. 1 8 Government is the over-all entity that includes
both the public and the officials and is consequently a
broader concept than that ot the state.

To translate Dewey's

terminology, one might say that government merely signifies

17

~-,

15.

18 Ibid ... , 17.
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all those who

h~ppen

to be members of a particular state in-

cluding the officials.

The state is the organization of the

people, its distinctive note is the existence of officials.
Now, "The state represents an important although distinctive and restricted social interest. n,l9

This restriction

of the state lies in the fact that it is concerned in general
with those activities of individuals and "primary"; social
groups which affect the security and prosperity of the public.

When the activities of these groups, however, a:re re ...

stricted to their own members, they are usually outside the
jurisdiction of the state.

The primary groups are defined as

the participants in joint action which has grown up out of
biological conditions or local contiguity:

they are families,

churches, schools, labor unions, business concerns, etc.
However, there is no hard and fast line of demarcation
setting off the

ex~ct

extent of state influence, as may be

seen from the following important qualification:
Our hypothesis is neutral as to any
general sweeping implications as to
how far state a.cti vi ty may extend.
~t times the consequences of conjoint
behavior of some persons may be such that
a large public interest is generated
which can be fulfilled only by laying
down conditions which involve a large
measure of r~construction within that

19 .QE• Cit. 28

group. There is no more inherent sanctity in a church, business corporation,
or family institution than there is in
the state. Their value is also to be
measured by their consequences.20
As to the infallibility of the state, Dewey holds no

brief for the stand of Rousseau that the •xpression of the
public's will is bound to be for the best interest of the public; moreover the public will is not the guiding factor of
the Instrumentalist state.

On the contrary, he points out:

•This conception of statehood does not imply any belief as to
the propriety or reasonableness of any particular act, measure,
or system. n.2l

In accord, too, with the whole dynamic concept

of Instrumentalism is the notion that a particular form of
state or organization can cease to serve the common interests
of the public.

Or as Dewey puts it, a new public has come

into existence, perhaps through some external agency like industrial change, and this new public must seek new means to
protect itself by the regulation of the new forces which have
been introduced into its environment. 22 Thus the central
problem of politics is the search for the public, the effort
to determine whose interests are being adversely affected

20 Ibid. 73.
21 Ibid. 2.9
22 Ibid. 44, 45.

and how tbay are being so affected.
In commenting on the actual operation of states, Dewey
remarks that power is poison.

Oftentimes public officials

are led to use their office to serve their own interests or
through ignorance or overcaution use it in the interests of
a particular class or group.

&a a corrective, •0n1y through

constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by
citizens can a state be maintained in integrity and useful•
nesa.•23
The general reaction of the state on those concerned
is summarized thus:
It is ~uite true that most states,
after they have been brought into
being, react upon the primary groupings. When. a state is a good state,
when the officers of the public genuinely serve the public interests, this
reflex effect is of great importance.
It renders the desirable associations
solider and more coherent; indirectly
it clarifies their aims and purges
their activities. It places a discount
upon injurious groupings and renders
their tenure of life precarious. In
performing these services, it ·gives the
individual members of valued associations greater liberty and security; it
relieves them of hampering conditions
which if they had to cope with person~
ally would absorb their energies in
mere negative struggle against evils.
It enables individual members to count
23 Ibid. 69.

with reasonable certaint1 upon what
others will do, and thus facilitates
mutuall'Y helpful cooperations. It
creates respect for others and for
one's self. A measure of the goodness of a state is the degree in which
it relieves individuals from the waste
of negative struggle and needle·ss conflict and confers upon him positive assurance and reinforcement in what he
undertakes.24
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Aln'Y description of the Instrumentalist sta.te which was
restricted to a detailing of its positive features would be
incomplete, tor an insight of the theor1 demands consideration of some of the factors that were denied or rejected in
its construction.

Perhaps the most important of these is

the question of the person or individual member of the state.
What ia his place,

What

protection can he expect from the

Instrumentalist statet
Dewey clearly recognized the importance of the individual
in non-Instrumentalist interpretations of the state:
suppose that an a priori conception
of the intrinsic nature ana limits of
the individual on one side and the
state on the other will 'Yield good
results once for all is absurd. If
however, the state has a definite nature, ~s it should have if it were formed
by fixed causal agencies, or if individuals have a nature fixed once for all
apart from conditions of association, a
final and wholesale partitioning of the
~o

24 Ibid. 71.
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realms of personal and state activity is
the logical conclusion.25

But since to an Instrumentalist the person is just another factor in •experience• continually changing from his reaction
with the things about him, he cannot be set up as a criterion
of value.

One cannot speak of definite,

~table

rights of

the person since the subject of those rights is himself so
mutable.
Something of the hypothetical nature of Dewey's notions
of the person may be gathered from the following, taken from
a recent book:
The: idea that human nature is inherently and exclusively individual
is itself a product or a cultural
individualistic movement. The idea
that mind and consciousness are intrinsically individual did not even
occur to anyone tor much the greater
part of human history ••• All we can
safely say is that human nature like
other forms of life tends to differentiation and this moves in the direction or the distinctly individual, and
that it also ~ends toward combination,
association. 2
At present, appeal to the individual
is dulled by our inability to locate
the individual with any assurance.
While we are compelled to note that
his freedom can be maintained only
through the working to getber toward
25
26

-Ibid.

65.

Freedom

~

.;.C. ;.;u;;;;:l..;;.tur.;;;..-.e, 21.

a single end of a large number of
different and complex factors, we
do not know how to coordinate them on
the basis of voluntary purpose.27
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The very existence of the problem of the individual and
the social is denied; and the problem which really gave
rise to the use of the generalizations, •individual• and
"social• is explained thus:
It indicates that ways of interaction
between human nature and cultural conditions are the first and fundamental thing to be examined, and that the
problem is to ascertain the effects
of interactions between different
components of different human beings
and different customs, rulea, traditions, institutions, the t&tngs called
•social.•28
.
Thus the obJect of investigation in this political problem
is not the

individua~

human being.

human being, but a component of that

The question of responsibility, rights and

duties is consequently by-passed.
Since, then, the individual human person and his rights
are omitted as a guide in outlining the activities of the
state, and since society and social bett•rment have been reJected,29the search for the •public• and the protection of

27 Ibid. 163.
28 Ibid. 33

----

29 Character and Events, 809.

its interests would seem to be the chief norm
litical philosophy.

ot
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n.wey•s po-

It must consequently be in the light ot

that norm that we analyze Instrumentalism &s a philosophy ot
democracy.

CHAPTER IV

INSTRUMENTALISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY
Throughout this chapter, unless specifically qualified,
democracy will be understood in the sense outlined in the
first chapter, that is an habitual determination of the general control of the political policies. of the commonwealth
by the bulk of the community through appropriate procedures
for participation and consent.

The application of Instru-

mentalism to the particular constitutional structure and
practice of democracy as it has been understood in this
country will be taken up in the following chapter.
Thus, the concept of democracy against which Instrumenta~ism

is to be analyzed as a possible philosophic basis and

apologetic is not exactly the democracy of which Mr. Dewey
writes, evMl in the restricted political sense.

For even

Dewey's notion of political democracy is based on his theory
'

of the state: •·But one of the meanings is distinctly political,
for it denotes a mode of government, a specified practice in
selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials.•!
Though not entirely different from the common idea of demo-

1 The Public and Its Problems, 82.

--

!9

cracy, the reference to officials in the special sense in
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which he has previously defined official, makes the notion
dependent upon his adverse-consequence explanation of the
state.
It is only fair to mention that Dewey, in claiming that
the acceptance of his philosophy is necessary for the defense
and growth of

democ~acy,

is usins democracy in the broad sense,

in the sense of the Radical Democrats.

However, Mr. Dewey does

not deny that as a matter of fact there is a political form,
where the people, for the protection of their natural rights,
limit the functions of the various departments of government
and control the policy of that government both directly and
through the choice and approval of representatives.2

At

most he would question the propriety ot calling that form
democracy.

He would

pro~bly

prefer to call it a •repre-

sentativeM government, in that it represents most closely
the public interest.3
To inquire, then, as to whether Mr. Dewey's concept of
the state naturally requires for its perfection and fulfillment the democratic form of government, we must have recourse
again to his definition: •The state is the organization of

-

2 Ibid. 86.

-

3 Ibid. 76

the public effected through officials tor the protection ot
the interests shared by its members.•
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He goes on shortly to

add:
our conception gives a criterion for
determining how good a particular
state is: namely the degree ot organization of the public which is
attained, and the degree in which its
officers are so constituted as to perform their function ot oaring tor public interests. But there ia no a
priori rule which can be laid down and
iti!ch when it is followed a gooi state
will be brought into existence.
Oonce~ently

according to Instrumentalism there are two pos-

itive criteria tor determining how good a state is: the degree ot organization ot the public and the efficiency ot its
otficera.

There is also the negative statement that no con-

crete torm of government can, on philosophical grounds, be
called a good state.

£a to the first ot the positive criteria, organization,
the sense in which Dewey accepts this term would seem to be
the common one ot subordination for the achievement ot an
end.

In one ot his works he describes what organization in

aooiety is:
Conscious agreements aaong men must supplement and in same degree supplant freedom ot action which is the gift of nature. In order to arriv• at these agree4

-Ibid.

33.

menta, indi viduala have to make concessions. They must consent to curtailment of some natural liberties in order that any of them may be rendered
secure and enduring. 'rhey must, in
short, enter into an organization
(Italics not found in orlglnal) with
other human beings so that the activities of others may be permanently counted
upon to assure regularity or action and
far-reaching scope of plans and courses
of action. 5
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In the same work he admits that organization tends to become
rigid and to limit freedom.e
This organization is perhaps the chief instrument of the
•official• in the performance of his specific function, warding ott harmful consequences of certain types or joint action.
For it would seem to be according to the Instrumentalist interpretation, a function of intelligence in disposing environing conditions in suehwise that the resulting activity will
be guided in a definite direction.

Since the notion of com-

mand and the moral force of authority are specifically rejected in Instrumentalism, this indirect process of channeling activity_through organization is ot paramount importance.
In treating the extent ot the state's activities, we
quoted Dewey as saying that at times the state might find it
necessary to undertake within smaller social groups such as ,
5

Human Nature

-

6 Ibid. 308

~

Conduct, 307

the church and the

~amily
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ma large measure of reconstruction."

This large measure of reconstruction includes moral as well
as purely physical means, for Dewey like Plato recognizes the
importanca of education and cultttral climate in giving direction to the activities of a people.

Hence there is no bound

other than the supposed exigencies pf a particular a1tuat1on
to limit the

organ1~1ng

activity of the state.

Considering organization as an integral part of the Instrumentalist theory of the state, it would seem at most to
be indifferent to a democratic form of government.

And since

democratic governments have alwa7s beeh notorious for their
cumbersome procedures by reason of overlapping agencies and
~hecks

and balances--from the days of the double consulship of

Rome to the division of power in the Ameriean Constitution-one would be led to conclude that with organization as the
criterion
high.

o~

a good state, democracy would not rate very

On the other hand organization is the very keynote or

the totalitarian regime.
The second criterion of a good state is the efficiency
of its officers, •the degree in which its officers are so
constituted as to perform their function of oaring for publie interests.• This notion of efficiency is open to two
interpretations. In the larger sense it may mean the offlees of government are so constituted as to achieve a max-

tmum of good for the people. including also in that

~ximum
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good the protection of the people against any abuse of official power.

In this sense the criterion would be a truism.

But since there is no specific reference in the explanation of
these criteria to a protection or the public from the official. it may be presumed that the second and more common
interpretation is intended, that is, that the officials have
at their disposal sufficient power tor the attainment of the
ends in hand.
Nor from an historical point ot view would it seem that
the criterion of getting things done and the ability to get
them done quickly is by any means & special property of the
democracy.

It is even a common saying that the democracy

sacrifices efficiency for the sake of freedom.

The neces-

sit7 of recourse to the people. even granted well established
procedures for the information of the electorate and the ope~ation

of elections or plebiscites, involves much more de-

tail and loss of time than would a spot decision on the part
of an official of some authoritarian regime.
The negative statement that Instrumentalism could give
no real

~

friori rule for the formation of a good state is

based on something fundamental in the Instrumentalist philosophy.

The reason no definite rule can be given is that

there is no definite end against which the various forms of

of government can be measured as
~he

state as an

ab~olute
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means.

end is out.

Mr. Dewey is very

definitely opposed to the Hegelian notion of setting up the
state as a supreme goal or absolute entity.

He sees it at

most as a social agency with a special work to do.
prevent the evil consequences of joint action.

It must

But what is

the basis of determining the evil or goodf
I do not admit anything but a strictly
relative distinction between·means and
ends. Consequently when I have touched
upon economic and political problems
in writing upon social philosophy I
have held that all such problems are
problems of valuation in the moral
sense. It is in this context that I
have dwelt upon inti!lifent action as
the sole and supreme me hoa of dealing
with economic and political issues.7
~is

intelligent action in social matters is a kind of in-

ternal automatic process of setting up a temporary end.
problem presents itself;

A

the unity of the mind is disturbed;

various solutions are tentatively considered on the basis of
past experience;

finally, with the consideration of one so-

lution, the unity and peace are restored •. This solution then
manifests itself in overt physical action.

The latest'solu-

tion is merely the projection of a temporary end or aim,a

7 "Experfenoe, Knowledge, and Value",
Dewey, 591.

!.!!.! Philosophy

_2!: ~

8 ffiunan Nature and Conduct, 180-182, 190-194; of. also •Deweyra
Ethical TheorjY; The Phllosophz of John Dewey, 314-317.

whioh will suffice until another problem arises.
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In summary, then, Dewey's basic philosophy of the state
fails to provide a convincing apologetic for political democracy.

The criterion of organization tends rather to favor

authoritarian forms where popular interference is reduced to
a minimum, as does the second criterion of efficient· officers.
Moreover, the very basis of this philosophy of the state precludes the possibility of its being an apologetic for any
definite political form.
In his analysis of the development of democracy, Mr.
Dewey admits as much:
The forms to which we are accustomed
in democratic governments represent the
cumulative effect of a multitude of
events, unpremeditated as far as political effects were concerned and having
unpredictable consequences. There is
no sanctity in universal suffrage, frequent elections, majority rule, congressional and cabinet·government. These
things are devices evolved in the direction in which the current was moving.9
However, in another phase of Dewey's social philosophy,
in his analysis of the notion of progress, we find something
of an apologetic for political democracy.

First of all, he

states that the problem of progress is a problem of discov-

9 The Public

~

Its Problems, 144.
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ering the needs and capacities of collective human nature as

at present aggregated in nations and races, and in inventing
social machinery that will aid in the satisfaction of those
needs and liberation of the powers.

The two chief obstacles

to progress 1 according to the theory, are the conservative
and the evolutionist outlook.

The former tends to look on

conventions and institutions as permanent and necessary, thus
checking salutary change 1 and the latter feels that the process of change ia automatic and fails to take the necessary
steps himself.
The aspect of this theory distinctly favorable to polit•
ical democracy is the statement, •ease of social change is
a condition of progress.•lO

Since the more democratic a

government is, the more plastic is its social structure,
democracy would seem to be the political form best satisfying this condition of progress.

But the second condition, the

intelligent direction of the social chenge would seem to be
another neutral or at least disputed factor with regard to
democracy.
The concept of progress was given a slightly different
turn in Dewey 1 s later works.

The article referred to above

appeared in the International Journal .2!, Ethics of April,
10 Character and Events, 822-827
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In the most complete expression of his political phil-

1916.
osophy1

~Public~

f!! Problems, 1927 1 the idea appeared

under the heading of •The Search for the Great Community.•

The

notion of the great community is the fulfillment of his idea

ot progress, a satisfaction of the needs of the public and a
fulfillment of its capacities, but it is a dynamic equilibrium rather than a static situation and at that an equilibrium never to be attained. 11 He described it thus:
Wherever there is conjoint activity
whose consequences are appreciated as
good by all the singular persons who
take part in it, and where the realiz:a.tion of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and eff'ort
to sustain it in being just because
it is a good shared by all 1 there is
in so far a community.l2
In anaJ.y•ing the historical events which have thus far
brought men to a closer realization of this ideal, Dewey
mentions that political democracy 1 in itself fostered by a
chance convergence of enonomic and social forces, has been
perhaps the chief determining factor;

but it is to be noted 1
he insists it is the desires and aims consequent upon the
practice of democracy rather than the form itself which are
of importance:

11

~

Public

12 Ibid. 149.

~

its Problems, 148.

That government exists to serve its
community, and that this purpose cannot
be achieved unless the community shares
in selecting its governors and determining their policies, are a deposit of
fact left, as far as we can see, permanentlz in tne wake-of-aoctrines and
forms, however transitory the latter.l3
(Italics are not found in or1gl~a1.)
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Atter showing how the fruition of this tendency on the part
of the members of the community to look out for their interest as a. community will lead to an exchange of ideas and enrichment of life as the circle of groups and individuals
affected by this beneficent influence widens, he concludes
that •the great community", never quite to be attained, constitutes a broad notion of democracy.
Certainly, here we find an instance of that central emphases in Instrumentalism, the enrichment of life from the
realization of the present experience with more extensive
realization resulting from wider and more diversified contacts with environment.

.In the spirit underlying this idea

we have what would appear to be a very definite impetus toward

democracy~

But unless the life to be enriched is that

of the individual human person and unless certain bounds are
set to what adverse circumstances living individuals here
and now are to be subjected in the name of attaining that
greater enrichment either for contemporary humanity or some
13 Ibid. 146.

generations to come, that spirit might well find its realization in some totalitarian form which advocates rather re•
pressive temporary methods for the eventual attainment of
a free society.
It is interesting, too, to note that. Mr. Dewey is not
averse to the use of force in this respect.

He refers to

social and political &s well aa physical agencies when he
states that power or energy is either a neutral or eulogistic term granted an end that is worth while.

And in the

use of power constraint may be necessary:
Constraint or coercion, in other words
is an incident of a situation under certain conditions--namely, where the means
for the realization are not naturally
at hand, so that energy has to be spent
in order to make some power into a
means for the end in hand.l4

Mr. Dewey, is careful to point out in his analysis
that the trend to democratic method was not the result of
political idealism and according to his own tenets, he can
only surmise that it seems to have left certain •permanent•
convictions amongst men ss to general policy in government.
Another very important topic in Mr. Dewey's social
writings is the question of science.

--·------14 Character

~

Events, 784.

He explains that his
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very philosophy of Instrumentalism owes its origin to the
advance of physical science.
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The chief contention of all

Mr. Dewey's philosophical writings, logical, epistemological,
psychological and ethical, is' that physical science by its
new method has advanced far ahead of the institutions of society and men's ways of thinking.

His role was to introduce

the new philosophy of method.
One of the important notions derived from the notion of
science is that invention is personal, it is the work of an
individual intelligence rather than of the community.
innovation or discovery comes from the individual.

The

Only after

it has become habitual does the state or the organized group
take it over.l5

The democratic inference of this notion might

be that unless there is freedom of movement on the part of the
individual and the power to initiate changes and reforms, the
organization of society would remain stagnant.
But apart fro.m the actual invention or new power thus
put at the disposal of society is the question of the direction in which that new power is to be used.

Mr. Dewey points

out that in contemporary society it would seem the group in
control of industry determine the direction of theapplication
of science. More than that, from the act-consequence theory,

-

Proble~,

------

15 The Public and Its

58-61.
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they provide a stimulus and thus indirectly select the field

in which future inventions will take place.

A very forceful

example in recent times of the control and impetus given to
technologi'cal advance by the Nazi regime, bears out Mr. Deweyre

statement that mere innovation or change, independent of

the intelligence applying it, will not of itself mean advance
toward the great community or the democratic ideal.

A stim-

ulus may be provided for individual initiative along certain
channels considered desirable by even an authoritarian regime.
As

to the parallel of method, in the social and physical

sciences, Mr. Dewey is wil'ling to admit that on the basis of
what has already been accomplished the outlook ia not very
bright.

-.nat purports to be experiment in the social field

is very different from experiment in natural science;

it is

rather a process of trial and error with some degree of hope
and a great deal of talk.•l6
But even granted a considerable advance in the science
of human nature, Mr. Dewey still points to the ominous possibility that the advance in knowledge might merely be the
means of putting more effective instruments into the hands
of those who desire to manipulate other human beings for their
16 Freedom

~Culture,

65.

for their own advantage.l7
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In this sense the newly acquired

knowledge would merely be a neutral power of the environment
available for whatever aim an intelligence here and now choses
to make of it.
But in spite of the rather insignificant advance thus far,
and the neutral character of social knowledge in itself, Mr.
Dewey sees important consequences for the future of democracy
in a growth of popular faith with regard to the effectiveness
of the scientific method in social affairs.

It would perhaps

be more accurate to say that rather than any cut and dried
method, it is a scientific attitude, or as he calls it a "morale• that alone is capable of establishing and furthering democratic processes.

Some of the distinctive notes of that at-

titude are:
willingness to hold belief in suspense,
ability to doubt until evidence is obtained, willingness to go where the evi·
dence points instead of putting first
a personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in solution to be
tested instead of as dogmas to be asserted; and (possibly the most distinctive of all) enjoyment of new fields
for inquiry and of new problems.l8
He also remarks that among scientists the number who have this
correct attitude even toward their own work is probably very
17 Ibid.l71.
18 Ibid. 145.

-
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small.

Two of the important results 1n political affairs which
he asserts follow from this scientific attitude are that it is
the only guarantee against misleading propaganda
ly~

and~

second•

it is the only assurance of a public opinion intelligent

enough to meet present social problems.
these

effects~

In the second of

he is professedly offering the method of science

as the only solution t.o the complex social problems which applied science have created or exaggerated.
s·cience through its physical technological consequences is now determining
the realtions which human beings severally and in groups~ sustain to one another. If it is incapable of developing moral techniques which will also determine these relations, the split in
modern culture goes so deep that not
only democracy but all civilized values
are doomed. Such at least is the problem~ a culture which permits science to
destroy traditional values but which
distrusts its power to create new ones
is a culture which is destroying itself.
War is a symptom as well as a cause of
the inner division.l9
To sum up the effect of John Dewey's theories of science
on a philosophy of political democracy:
tion and

discovery~

the basis of

change~

dividual rather than the group, hence
19 Ibid.l54.

first of all,· invenproceed from the in-

th~re

must be

leewa~

for initiative if any change is to take place.
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Secondly, the

scientific attitude helps to counteract propaganda and helps
toward solving the political problems of a complex civilization.
However, scientific advance in either the physical or social
field is of itself indifferent to democracy, the direction in
which it is used depends upon the intelligence taking advantage of it.
Perhaps the most important indication of the relation of
Instrumentalism to Political democracy is to be found in Mr.
Dewey's

anal~sis

of the present crisis of democracy and espe-

cially in the solution he offers for that crisis.

The first

of the problems he sees confronting democracy today is brought
about by the abundance of physical and moral forces that have
recently been made available to man.

The difficulty is how

to use these forces so as to prevent the subjection resulting from war and economic strife.

The second problem is per-

haps another phase of the first, it is the basic politica
problem ot individual freedom vs. organization.

Security

and protection demand organization, but the more efficient
the organizations become, the greater are the sacrifices of
freedom demanded by that efficiency. The third problem he
poses is the prevailing dichotomy of attitude that chooses
discussion and persuasion in politics but relies on dogma
and authority in religious and social thinking and educa-
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tional methods.20

The one basic solution he offers to all these problems
is a universal renewal of faith in human nature. 21 He appeals
to the American tradition of belief in the common man as an
expression of belief in human nature.

But in this same treat-

ment, Mr. Dewey very clearly demonstrates that he is not
speaking of any theories based on the nature and rights of
individuals.

He prefers to speak of human nature in the large.

and the interaction of components of human nature, since it
is so difficult "'to locate the individual."'
This renewal of fat th is an aim to be inculcated.

It

can only be accomplished in an environment where all the factors of culture foster the "humanistic 111 outlook, where faith
in man's ability to solve all his problema by democratic processes: prevails.

Hence the first step is to establish the

humanistic culture.
•e have to see that democracy means the
belief that humanistic culture should
prevail; we should be frank and open
in our recognition that the proposition
is a moral one--like ~y idea that concerns what should be.22

20 ~· 165-168.

21 Ibid. 123-124
22 Ibid. 124.
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This establishment of the humanistic culture is to begin in
the schools and include church and family. 23
In reviewing Instrumentalism as a basis for political

democracy, its most significant contribution would seem to be
in the theory of progress, especially in the idea that the
enriching and fulfillment of all the capacities of human nature will be best achieved by an environment wherein all the
divergent groups of the world's population freely interact.
So, too, in promoting a scientific attitude, Instrumentalism
would serve an important need in the maintenance of a healthy
democracy;

it would supplant the merely emotional standards

of the typical

v~ter

with objective pragmatic criticism.

In fact, the whole dynamic concept of Instrumentalism
with its accent on adaptability and willingness to advance
touches something almost essential in the democratic spirit.
It is perhaps a necessary counterpart to the attitude of Edmund Burke's ideal statesman with his disposition to preserve
and ability to improve.

This accent on advance, progress,

and experiment is important to a contemporary democracy, where
change of officers, continual review of policies, and a susceptibility to initiative from every segment of the public
are supposed to prevail.

23 Ibid. 1.29.
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In approving that aspect of Mr. Dewey's philosophy which
advocates the widespread inculcation of a scientific attitude
toward government, it is on the assumption that it be a true
scientific attitude, that is one based on the natural law,
recognizing the dignity of the human person and the necessary
limits of the powers of the state.

This, unfortunately, is

not,the way Mr. Dewey or his fc;>llowers interpret the phrase,
scientific attitude.
But the inadequacy of Instrumentalism as a. philosophical
apologetic of the political form of democracy becomes apparent
when the best its

a~thor

can offer in an earnest endeavor to

defend democracy is a vague ":belief" in its desirability, or
in the Instrumentalist terminology, in proposing a temporary,
ideal aim.

In speaking of the specific forms which distin-

guish political democracy, the best Mr. Dewey, as a good Instrumentalist, can say of them is that up to the present they

!!!! to have been discoveries of lasting value.
The philosophy of the state which Mr. Dewey erected on
his adverse-consequence theory is completely indifferent to
democracy or any other form of government so long as that
form professes to act in the public interest.

It offers no

intrinsic principle that would lead to the adoption of either
a government by the many or the few.

All that is required is

that a scientific attitude and pragmatic approach govern the

decisions of the officers.

The crucial test of this indif-
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ference comes in the conflict between the individual and the
group.

According to the Instrumentalist philosophy of the

state there is no indication as to the direction and no bounds
set as to the extent of state action in such conflicts.
Fundamentally~

the reason Mr. Dewey's effort to find a

philosophy of democracy to supplant the doctrine of natural
rights proved inadequate is that a process philosophy can
justify nothing more than the process method and change.
{Indeed by identifying danocracy with pluralism and experimentalism he claims to have accomplished nothing more.)

If

all that was needed for an adequate defense of political democracy was a justification of a plastic society allowing for
freedom of interaction and growth in the body at large 1 Instrumentalism would suffice.

But .Mr. Dewey himself has

stressed the importance of direction, the second condition
for progress;

and without some definite knowledge of the na-

ture of the components of a society, one cannot with consistency advocate the premanent vesting of direction in any definite proportion of that society.

Unless there is something

sacred and of permanent value in the individual human

being~

there can be nothing sacred or of per-manent value in a system
safeguarding the political prerogatives of individuals.

CHAPTER V
PRACTICAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INSTRUMENTALISM
Perhaps the most succinct statement of Mr. Dewey's disagreement with the traditional basis of &merica•a constitutional government is his commentary on the opening words of
the Declaration of Independence:

We repeat the opening words of the Declaration of Independence but unless
we translate them they are couched in
a language that even when it comes
readily to our tongue, does not penetrate today to the brain. •These truths
are self-evident: that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with inherent and unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and. the pursuit of happiness.
Today we are wary of anything purporting to be self-evident truths; we are
not given to associating politics with
the plans of the Creator; the doctrine
of natural rights which governed his
style of expression has been weakened
by historic and by philosophic criticism.l
But aside from the mere statement of disagreement, Mr.
Dewey has a positive concept of law to supplant the old notion of the harmony of government with the natural law and
its consequent derived authority.
1

Freedom~

Culture, 156.
60

He has a theory of social
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interaction that precludes a doctrine of individual. rights and
throws a different light on the place of the small community
in a democracy.
To take up first the Instrumentalist concept of law, it
is apparent from the adverse-consequence theory of the state-apart from the statement just quoted--that Mr. Dewey prescinds
from any consideration of the place of God in his political
theory.

Consequently, with the notion of the Eternal Law

obsolete, there is no grounds for a discussion of the Natural Law. Mr. Dewey, accordingly, derives his notion of law
from his theory of the state.
In context, however, Mr. Dewey says there are but three
alternative explanations of law and authority.

He concludes

that any theory asserting that will has a causal force in
the origin of the state must necessarily devolve into a doctrine of superior force when the justification of the will
which issues commands is questioned.

In like manner, Rous-

seau's doctrine of an overruling general will and either the
absolute will or absolute reason of German metaphysics are
merely other names for superior force.

The only alternative,

he concludes is a doctrine based on widely distributed consequences.
"Rules of law are in fact the institution of conditions
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under which persons make their arrangements with one another.•2
The whole purpose of the law is to forecast consequences more
accurately.

When there is a uniform way of doing things, one

oan count on the

probabl~

action of his neighbors.

The one

who violates a law is merely exposing himself to the possible
adverse consequence of being caught and punished, consequently
the moral force of the
remains.

l~w

is lost.

Only the penal aspect

The law is based on long-run consequences and its

purpose is to help men overcome their shortsightedness.
According to this interpretation, judges may make laws
in their official capacity, if they are merely defining further conditions of action. 3 There is here no ~estion of
retributive justice or right and wrong.

The courts have the

'

same function as the state in general, the preventing of adverse consequences.
In the field of criminal legislation, Dewey's theories
would not necessarily lead to great divergence from present
procedure.

He does not hold with Lambroso that the criminal

is entirely a victim of circumstances.

Although he concedes

a great deal to habit and environment, Mr. Dewey declares
that the basic mistake is a failure to consider consequences,

2

~

Public

~

3 Human Nature

!!!

~

~P~r_o_b~le~m-s~,

54.
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and public punishment is necessary to this end.

Mr. Dewey
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does, however, stress the fact that the members of society
share in the criminal's responsibility by not doing their
part to eliminate the social environment that produces crime.
In this regard he mentions that the concept of retributive
justice serves as a means of dodging responsibility: "'By
killing an evil-doer or shutting him up behind stone walls,
we are enabled to forget both him and our part in creating
him. " 4
But in the general interpretation of law and in judicial
procedure, Dewey's theories might have profound effects.

No

longer would the purpose of the court be restricted to a determination of fact and the rendering of a decision in accordance with existing statutes.

On

the contrary, only the

consequences of the present act would merit consideration.
All l&w seems under this interpretation to be reduced to the
status of penal laws and the notion of permanent constitutions
or a corpus juris becomes outmoded with the idea of the growth
and forecasting of consequences.5
A very interesting phase of Mr. Dewey's democracy is the
role of the functional group and the ·small community.

-

4 Ibid.

18.

--- --- --------

5 The Public and Its Problems, 45.

Begin-

ning on the assumption of the disintegration of the family,
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church, and neighborhood,6 he points to the void they have
lett in social lite.

In his theory, it is the intimate face-

to-face association that stimulates the deepest reaction and
ingrains the most lasting habits of action, thought and emotion.

Unfortunately, the technological age has necessitated

a wider field of organization with a consequent destruction
of the small, local unit.

But, with the general basis of

material security the technological age is capable of establishing, a humane age can emerge.7

And the chief requisite

for the establishment of this humane age is recourse to local communal life: •unless local communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent problem:

to find and identify itself."a
The principle, then, that would guide the growth of this

new democracy would be that the reactions of groups bound
together by a common interest and intimate association are
of the greatest permanent value.
I~

is true that ties formed by sharing
in common work whether in what is called
industry or what are called professions

6

~-

2,15.

7 Ibid. 217.
8 Ibid. 216.

have nQw a force which formerly they
did not possess. But these ties can be
counted upon for an enduring and stable
organization, which at the same time is
flexible.and moving, only a~ they grow
out of immediate intercourse and attachment ••• There is no substitute for the
vitality and depth of close and direct
intercourse and attachment.9
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The: political impact of this principle is evident when one
considers that the

~public•

of Mr. Dewey's theory of the state

comas into existence and is bound together solely by its common interest, a sharing in the consequences of particular acts.
If the community is to find itself and protect itself, it must
know what those interests are;

hence a government organized

on the basis of common interest would came closest to solving
the problem of the public.
'!'here is in this principle and its application to a
political community a strange affinity with the papal ideal
of an organic society.

Both, working from a different point

of view, recognize the importance of the personal and intimate association aa opposed to the impersonal and artificial
social patterns imposed by the large scale centralization of
the new industrial age.

Mr. Dewey closes

~

Public and Its

Problems with these words: -w.e lie, as Emerson said, in the
lap of an immense intelligence.

-

9 Ibid. 212-213.

But that intelligence is

dormant and its communications are broken, inarticulate and
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faint until it possesses the local community as ite medium.•lO
Perhaps the best general summary of the social philosophy of John

~ewey

would be a record of the influence of the

central thesis of Instrumentalism in his social writings.
After studying his analysis of disparate political and cultural problems, after examining the new concepts and definitions he has attached to such well known words as state, the
public, and even law, it is surprising to note the consistency
and singleness of approach that mark his writings on all of
these topics.

All of them are seen as different manifesta-

tions of intelligence in action.
The occasional apparent discrepancy in the works of Mr.
Dewey, who denies the existence of any absolutes, who refuses
even to discuss the problem of causation, yet who refers to
ends and means, better and worse, can be resolved in the realization that for him intelligence when confronted with a single concrete problem, 1mmeadiately envisages various outcomes
and intuitively perceives a hierarchy of desirability amongst
these various outcomes;

this operation of intelligence in

facing a singular, concrete problem creates the temporary
Dewey means and ends, better and worse.

10 Ibid. 219.
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The whole question of method and emphasis on science are

merely rules of thumb for the exercise of intelligence in concrete situations.

Though as a matter of historical fact, the

laboratory method of synthesis and experimentation provided
the inspiration for Mr. Dewey's Instrumentalism, once that
philosophy was formulated, the various sciences became merely
different manifestations of intelligence in action.
The whole political philosophy outlined in

!h!

Public and

Its Problems is merely one limited phase of intelligent action.
The problems of the state are only those which imply a common interest on the part of the whole people, problems with
adverse or beneficial results affecting them all.

In fact,

according to Mr. Dewey, a public or a state exists only as a
result of these problems and continues in existence only so
long as the problems remain.

The official, or government,

becomes the intelligence intrusted with the solution of these
common problems.
With this notion of the state as its basis and judged
by Mr. Dewey's own standards of the good state, organization
and efficiency, the burden of this thesis is rather easily
proved, Instrumentalism is a less than indifferent apologetic
for Constitutional democracy.
Thus far we have summarized the positive impact of the
Instrumentalist notion of intelligence on the political theory
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of John Dewey. If all that he did was formulate a theory based
on his concept of intelligent action, his work would be rather
innocuous.

It would mean simply that the purpose of the govern-

ment is to prevent any evil consequences that might befall the
community as a result of joint action.

The means at hand to

prevent these consequences being the proper disposition of
the factors involved in the problem.

A proper regard for the

nature and dignity of the human person and the whole natural
law' might, under one interpretation be reckoned as factors
worthy of consideration, but this is not Mr. Deweyrs interpretation.
In the first place, as was noted before, according to the
Dewey interpretation, intelligence is not to be confused with
the perception of the given.ll

Intelligence does not perceive

essences; it is concerned merely with consequences.

Our

know-

ledge of the human person is so vague that we cannot isolate
him from his environment, much less treat of his intrinsic
rights.

This prescinding from the individual human person

is of the very greatest moment in the consideration of democracy, for as Mr. Dewey himself admits, democracy was built
on the theory of natural rights. 12 All that he can offer as

11 Character
12 Freedom

~

~

Events, II, 797.

Culture, 64.
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a substitute is a hope that man 1 s experience with democracy,

his •taith in human nature• will lead him to preserve the
democratic rorm of government.
As

to the practical political implications or Mr. Dewey 1 s

philosophy, law is just another arbitrary expedient made use
of by the government to prevent adverse consequences for the
whole community;

the traditional distinction between the

runctions of judge and legislator is dropped. As another rather vague political implication, Mr. Dewey explains the desirability of an increase in the power and vitality or the local communal group without, at the same time, mentioning how
this is to be brought about on the present political scene.
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